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Summary: Energy policy and regulatory challenges in natural gas 
infrastructure and supply  in the energy transition in Sweden 
Sweden is undergoing a major energy transition in which the present 
regulatory, competition and energy decisions will determine future 
involvement in the “oil and gas game” after decades of successful imple-
mentation of non-fossil fuel dependence policies. Contrary to major energy 
policies implemented since the oil crisis of the 70’s, higher natural gas 
investment in infrastructure – in particular regarding offshore pipelines – 
is not an outcome of a consented agreement between the government and 
private firms. The lack of clear governmental definition towards the time to 
phase out nuclear terminals, and how this source of energy would be 
replaced, is leading the country towards an energy bottleneck that could 
condition future energy supply, thus governance. Under these conditions, 
crucial decisions shall be taken in the near future regarding granting 
permissions to pipelines that connect to the Russian natural gas fields 
following an EU trend, to the Norwegian natural gas reserves on the trail of 
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Sweden has independent regulatory agencies,1 increasing competition in its 
deregulated sectors (as electricity) and in the natural gas sector, a total 
fossil energy dependence (there is no production of natural gas, oil or coal) 
and historical judicial independence. These conditions favor private 
investment on infrastructure, but up to now private investment in natural 
gas infrastructure has been quite low, an outcome that could be partially 
explained because other sources aided by governmental support have the 
capacity to fulfill the actual energy needs. 
Private investment in natural gas infrastructure without full support 
from the government would introduce changes in the traditional energy 
model, in which the government and private firms work together closely.  
Higher private investment in natural gas infrastructure and consumption 
would push forward towards the introduction of changes in the traditional 
Swedish Ownership Model, in which “the controlling ownership in firms is 
typically concentrated to one or two owners. Often, but not always, these 
owners are Swedish families” (Henrekson & Jakobsson 2003, 5).  A more 
complex natural gas industry would certainly have Swedish and foreign 
owners, public and private owners, at its different levels. It will be particu-
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larly interesting to follow the role of the municipalities in the new arrange-
ments. 
This paper will study energy policy and regulatory challenges in natural 
gas infrastructure and supply in the context of an energy transition in 
Sweden, emphasising on its current and historical Nordic energy links while 
considering the presence of diffusion mechanisms in the region.2 The 
Swedish case was studied from October 2005, in which time apart from 
bibliographical and field research in Stockholm, Uppsala and Eskilstuna, 
different open-ended interviews were held. The research paid special atten-
tion to the exogenous influences driving change in the natural gas sector in 
Sweden. The results obtained raise more questions than answers regarding 
energy policy and regulation in natural gas infrastructure and supply, 
changing issues that could condition governance and redefine the relation 
with different Nordic, communitarian and European institutions in the near 
future.  
The current energy transition in Sweden could be synthesized in the 
following way: the main energy source will be phased out, and renewable 
energy sources at this point cannot fill this gap themselves yet, and a more 
extended network and use of natural gas could reverse a path-dependence 
(Pierson 2000) of non-reliance in fossil fuels. As a result of the implemen-
tation of non-oil dependence policies, fossil fuels have been substituted in 
the residential and service sectors with nuclear and hydro energy and more 
recently, and in a lower degree, with renewable energy sources; in the 
heating market for residential and commercial buildings oil has been 
gradually replaced by district heating. 
In 1970 the total oil use within the residential and the service sectors of 
Sweden was 118.6 TWh, in 1985 was 49.4 TWh and in 2005 was 15.9 TWh. 
In the same years, the final electricity use in these sectors was 21.9TWh in 
1970, 61.9 TWh in 1985 and 71.6 in 2005 (Swedish Energy Agency 2006, 
10-11). These figures reflect Sweden’s reliance on electricity in the last 
decades, and also the way in which it has tried and to some extent managed 
to avoid dependence on fossil fuels in sectors other than transport. 
As a result of a referendum conducted in 1980 all nuclear terminals 
should be phased out with no further construction; nuclear energy repre-
sented in 2006 30%, 210TWh out of 630 TWh, of the total energy supplied 
in the country (Swedish Energy Agency 2006, 6). The 1980 referendum 
required voters to choose between 3 ways for phasing out nuclear energy; 
the possibility to go further with the nuclear power program was not an 
option. The most voted decision was to continue with the operation of 
active and under construction plants until “the end of their normal operat-
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ing lives (assumed to be 25 years). Parliament decided then to embargo 
further expansion of nuclear power and aim for decommissioning the 12 
plants by 2010 if new energy sources were available realistically to replace 
them” (Nuclear Energy Association 2008).  
Phasing out nuclear terminals means another energy source will replace 
nuclear energy, the second source of energy (after oil crude oil and oil 
products) nationwide. Natural gas is the most plausible source of energy to 
replace nuclear energy in electricity production, and right now is the 
paradigmatic moment in which different projects in natural gas infrastruc-
ture could be approved by the government in order to fulfill the future 
energy demand. For this to happen private companies would have to invest 
heavily in natural gas infrastructure, and their projects would have to 
comply with the EU and Sweden’s competition regulations and environ-
mental codes and with all the international treaties Sweden has signed. 
 
2. Fossil fuels, renewable fuels or nuclear energy? 
Following the oil crisis of the 70´s, Sweden decided to rely less on oil and 
more in their own and renewable fuels.3 In this process, district heating 
played a fundamental role in replacing oil in the heating of buildings, and 
other fuels played a major role in replacing oil in district heating produc-
tion. 
“District heating is the generation and distribution of hot water in a 
pipeline system for the collective heating of commercial and residential 
buildings (Swedish Energy Agency 2005, 45).” The primary tendency in the 
energy input for district heating has been substituting oil for biofuels, waste 
heat, heat pumps and natural gas. In 1970, from a total energy input for 
district heating of 14.6 TWh, oil accounted for 14.3 TWh and biofuels 
accounted only for 0.3 TWh; in 1980 the former accounted for 30.9 TWh, 
the latter for 2.3 TWh and waste heat for 0.6 TWh of a total of 34.5 TWh; in 
2006 oil accounted for 3.2 TWh, biofuels  for 36.2 TWh, natural gas 
(including LPG) for 2.2 TWh, heat pumps for 5.6 TWh and waste heat for 
4.6 TWh of a total energy input for district heating of 55.4 TWh (Swedish 
Energy Agency 2007b, 24-25). 
In 1978, oil accounted for 60% of the heating market for residential and 
commercial buildings, whereas district heating represented around 10%; in 
2003 the numbers had inverted and district heating accounted for 50% of 
the share of the market and oil for approximately 10%.  
From 1970-2007, the development of heat pumps in district heating and 
natural gas and gasworks gas followed a similar path; the former started in 
1980 and in 2006 accounted for 6 TWh of the total energy supply, whereas 
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the latter started in 1985 and in 2006 represented 11 TWh (Swedish Energy 
Agency 2007b, 11). 
However, the major obstacle towards a higher natural gas use in Sweden 
since the last quarter of the 20th century has been nuclear power, its major 
competitor. The main player in the natural gas market in the period 1985-
1995 was SwedeGas, which was controlled by the electric power industry 
(Agfors 1995, 227). This type of ownership pleads for more research focus-
ing on the possible capture by the incumbent electricity firm  – what could 
be catalogued as self or endogenous capture – that could have blocked a 
higher natural gas development in order to maintain its market profits.  
Capture theory states that either regulation is supplied in response to the 
industry’s demand for regulation or the regulatory agency comes to be 
controlled by the industry over time (Bernstein 1955). Stigler (1971) identi-
f i e d  4  t y p e s  o f  p o l i c i e s  a n  i n d u s t r y  w o u l d  l i k e  t o  i n f l u e n c e :  g o v e r n m e n t  
subsidies to the industry, government-created barriers to (market) entry, 
policies that affect substitutes or complements to the industry and govern-
ment’s fixing price to prevent price competition (Laffont & Tirole 1994). 
This argumentation considers that regulation can sometimes benefit certain 
firms, i.e. by raising barriers to entry competitors (Coglianese et al 2004, 
24). 
On the other hand, natural gas was the fuel whose supply grew the most 
amongst oil, LPG, biofuels, coal, coke oven gas and blast furnace gas in the 
supply of fuel for electricity production in the period 1983-1993; it 
increased from 54 GWh to 962 GWh, respectively (Swedish Energy Agency 
2007b, 20-21). 
The future of natural gas supply and infrastructure is intrinsically related 
with competition, but is also a matter of governmental certainty and energy 
policy definition. The decision to phase out the nuclear reactors has been 
delayed repeatedly; a responsible decision considering there wasn’t any 
other plausible source to replace nuclear energy, and it is still not clear 
which energy source will replace nuclear energy. 
In the last two decades, energy policies have focused on setting a date-
line for phasing out nuclear energy, while stopping the use of rivers for 
hydro power generation, fostering the use of biofuels, introducing higher 
taxation on coal and oil targeting the reduction of CO2 emissions through 
taxation and following EU emissions targets and directives towards more 
natural gas competition. These policies are guiding Sweden to an energy 
bottleneck that urgently needs a clearer decision about the moment in 
which nuclear terminals will be phased out. 
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In 2006, 46.4% of the electricity production came from nuclear energy 
(Swedish Energy Agency 2007b, 20), and in 2005 Sweden produced 8016 
kWh per person from nuclear energy, whereas France produced 7201 kWh 
even though nuclear energy accounts for more than 75% of their electricity 
production (Idem, 22). This data reflects how heavily Sweden relies on 
nuclear energy, how difficult it will be to replace and also the importance of 
making the right choices regarding the new source/s and supplier/s.  
Annual electricity consumption in Sweden is increasing yearly around 
1%, and the current production exceeds the consumption by 30%, providing 
the government with an important margin of action. This energy surplus 
will disappear with the nuclear energy, which will be phased out sooner or 
later. The governmental approach to this dilemma has been to delay the 
decision perhaps waiting for new technologies to come or for more powerful 
renewable sources, but this behavior is now incompatible with securing the 
future energy supply and governance. 
If nuclear power is phased out by 2020, natural gas is the most feasible 
energy for replacing it in electricity production, and this would need further 
network development, as well as private investment in infrastructure. If the 
reactors are phased out in 60 years, as foreseen by the Climate in Focus 
Scenario (Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering Sciences (IVA) 2003), 
nuclear energy would be replaced by new carbon-dioxide-free electricity 
production, and in this case natural gas could be used through CO2 
sequestration. 
Energy Foresight – Sweden in Europe (IVA 2003, 7) reminds us that 
“The traditional Swedish model of developing and building large technical 
systems has often seen close cooperation between Government and indus-
try (e.g. Vattenfall and Asea, and Televerket and Ericsson)”. This coopera-
tion played a major role in the last three decades in determining nuclear 
energy as the main power generator, and has not encouraged a higher use 
of fossil fuels. 
An electricity certificate system that started in May 2003 to promote 
electricity production from renewable sources and peat has the objective for 
2016 to produce 17 TWh, relative to production from these sources in 2002. 
The Swedish Energy Agency and Svenska Kraftnät are responsible for the 
operation of this certificate system working towards a more environmen-
tally friendly energy system that will be active until 2030. The way in which 
the system operates is based on close coordination between producers of 
renewable electricity and peat, electricity suppliers and the government 
(Swedish Energy Agency 2008b). Its production aims are plausible, even 
conservative, and alternative electricity production will ease the nuclear 
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transition. That is to say, the electricity certificate system could act as a 
complementary factor in the nuclear transition, but will not replace nuclear 
energy in the next decade. 
A mechanism that the Swedish government applied since 1991 with the 
aim of encouraging the use of biofuels over fossil fuels was the implemen-
tation of a carbon dioxide tax, which is still in use. In 2003, the CO2 tax in 
Sweden was 14 times higher than in Germany, 4 times higher than in 
Norway and 2.5 times higher than in the Netherlands (IVA 2003, 12); this 
tax was too high to permit a competitive integration in the communitarian 
market. 4 
Unlike bunker oil and coal, natural gas was exempted from paying 
sulphur taxes in 2007 (Swedish Energy Agency 2007a). However, natural 
gas does pay energy and carbon dioxide taxes (excluding VAT), which 
accounted in 2005 for around 30% of the total price for industrial consum-
ers and 50% for domestic consumers (Swedish Energy Agency 2005, 35). 
The tax system operates in accordance to communitarian directives, such as 
the Act Concerning Taxation of Energy that entered into force in 1994, and 
the EU Emissions Trading System, which foster the use of natural gas over 
coal and oil because it produces less CO2 emissions when is burnt.5  
Reducing taxes on unemployment and increasing taxes on energy use 
and emissions in 2000, the Swedish government expected to raise up to 
SEK 30,000 million and to reduce emissions (Swedish Energy Agency 
2004, 12). Though environmentally friendly, this energy tax raise consti-
tutes another barrier towards developing a competitive natural gas market 
at the national and communitarian levels.  
Natural gas has great potential in replacing nuclear power in electricity 
production, a process that could be done at different stages and periods of 
time. The report Energy Foresight– Sweden in Europe (IVA 2003) 
suggests that instead of replacing nuclear power definitively natural gas 
could also be used as a “temporal” bridge on the way to a solar and hydro-
gen society. 
Different scenarios in Energy Foresight – Sweden in Europe (IVA 2003) 
foresee that hydrogen will play a fundamental role in the energy future after 
2020. Sweden has more probabilities to achieve a hydrogen-driven society 
than countries with higher dependence of fossil fuels. And the less depend-
ence in fossil fuels the higher these probabilities will maintain. But even in 
the case of a hydrogen-driven society a bigger natural gas network will be 
needed because natural gas could either act as a bridge towards hydrogen 
or be used in its production.  
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Energy Foresight – Sweden in Europe (IVA 2003) also predicts higher 
energy consumption in the transport sector, which relies on fossil fuels as 
its primary energy source. This fossil fuel dependence makes it more diffi-
cult to transition to a transportation system based on electricity, hybrid 
cars, hydrogen and solar energy. All these energy sources will increase its 
actual potential in the future, but for the moment it is too risky to consider 
that they will have enough capacity for replacing oil; it would be equivalent 
to considering that nuclear power could be replaced in the future with wind 
power because of technological improvements. The most plausible scenario 
is that other fossil fuels will play a major role in replacing oil in the next 
decades. 
Energy scenarios that are not considered in Energy Foresight – Sweden 
in Europe (IVA 2003) are a process of energy re-regulation, a more decisive 
role of the society and a more passive role of the government in deciding the 
energy policies, much higher energy needs in the immediate future (i.e. in 
the case of the establishment of new industries and services), energy 
consumption changes in the pulp and paper industries and rocketing oil 
prices. 
The residential and service sectors actually represent around 40% of the 
total use of energy, so apart from taxes, more media and information 
campaigns would help in the process of saving energy, an objective that 
both citizens and government share. F o r m u l a s  t h a t  d o  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  
represent more taxes paid by the domestic consumers must be explored. 
 
3. Natural gas: A Nordic tradition 
Natural gas was first used in Sweden in 1985, since then its use has been 
growing at different paces and it may increase importantly in the next 
decades due to several undergoing changes in energy and natural gas at the 
national, Nordic, communitarian and European levels. Traditionally, this 
country has relied on the Nordic countries (mainly Norway and Denmark) 
to fulfill its energy needs, and it is most probable that new energy and 
natural gas suppliers will appear in this or the next decades. In the whole 
changing issue, the influence of the EU representatives and institutions 
together with its regulatory reforms constitute two specific exogenous 
influences redefining the equilibrium towards more competition and open-
ness in the natural gas sector. 
Sweden does not produce any natural gas, and all the gas that it 
consumes is imported from a pipeline coming from Denmark. In this sense, 
the more natural gas Sweden imports the less control it has in its own 
energy supply and the greater the dependency on foreign suppliers. These 
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are key elements to be considered for understanding why a bigger natural 
gas market and network has not been developed yet. It is possible that non-
fossil dependence and energy sovereignty policies, in conjunction with the 
promotion of renewable sources of energy and an extended use of nuclear 
energy haven’t encouraged the diversification of energy sources. 
Refraining from a more extended natural gas network and use consti-
tutes a very effective way to be protected from the continuous shocks in the 
rising oil prices, which depend on external shocks such as wars, invasions, 
regime changes, institutional crises, strikes, natural disasters, terrorist 
attacks, accidents, disruption of supply and social and political instability in 
countries and regions, among others. Thus, a remarkable outcome of the 
non-fossil fuel dependence policies together with policies promoting 
nuclear energy has been securing a safe energy supply.  
Natural gas and oil prices are indexed and behave in a similar way; the 
Swedish policy to rely more on their own energy sources rather than in 
fossil fuels in general and natural gas in particular has secured higher 
protection to the continuous price variances than other countries without 
national fossil fuels resources (like most of the EU countries). Electricity 
production in Sweden is cheap and oil prices are mounting, two specific 
factors not favoring more natural gas consumption. 
Murray (2005, 8) explained that “Sweden’s current electricity supply is 
based on relatively high capital cost/low operating costing technologies 
(specifically hydroelectricity and nuclear power). […] this makes it relatively 
immune to rising primary energy prices, because the fuels – water and 
uranium – represent a much lower percentage of the kilowatt hour cost 
than is the case for fossil fuels”. Using primarily electricity instead of natu-
ral gas has also saved Sweden a lot of money; the price of a Brent crude oil 
barrel was 19.49 USD in the first semester of 2002, 59.66 USD in the last 
trimester of 2005 and 125 USD in the second trimester of 2008 (Bloomberg 
2008). 
The Swedish Energy Agency had the expectation in 2005 that greater 
competition in the natural gas sector would be translated into lower prices 
(Swedish Energy Agency 2005, 35), and in 2007 stated that “The under-
lying purpose of deregulation of the natural gas markets around the world 
has been to create the right conditions for effective utilization of resources, 
and thus keep down gas prices” (Swedish Energy Agency 2007a, 45). The 
evolution in the price of natural gas from 2005 to the second trimester of 
2008, parallel to several deregulatory reforms worldwide, has been the 
contrary: more competition and deregulation in the natural gas market 
have been accompanied by higher prices. As long as the price of natural gas 
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is indexed to the price of crude oil, higher competition in the Swedish 
market or anywhere else cannot affect the latter. Nevertheless, a higher 
competition in the natural gas market has given more options to the clients 
and new growth perspectives to the industry. Competition has had a quali-
tative impact on the natural gas market in Sweden. 
In the context of increasing investment in commodities in the stock 
markets, oil and natural gas prices are predicted to continue increasing. 
Furthermore, there is no insurance policy against the external shocks that 
have an impact on price variances. In this sense, Sweden has to consider if 
entering the “oil and natural gas game” will be part of the solution or part of 
the problem for its current energy transition. In the case that it is part of the 
solution, it is important to focus on the mechanisms that will connect its 
solid institutional background with the future natural gas supply. 
Sweden has a 200-year tradition of bureaucracy built in semi-autono-
mous agencies (Gilardi 2003, 13) as well as very strong political constraints, 
a Parliamentary system with a highly consolidated independence of the 
judiciary, an autonomous energy regulator, total fossil energy dependence 
and increasing competition in the sector. Following the model The Effect of 
Institutions on Public Policy and Sector Performance (Berg 2001, 6),6 
these conditions favor private investment in infrastructure, and in 
conjunction with the ongoing energy transition could foster higher private 
investment in natural gas infrastructure in the years to come. 
A more extensive natural gas network will lead towards more consump-
tion, and will condition the role of natural gas in the energy future. The 
expansion of the current natural gas network depends on formal conditions 
such as the national and communitarian regulations and informal condi-
tions such as political will, to an extent that is very difficult to determine 
from the academy. The capacity of the Swedish government and the 
regulatory agencies to determine a national energy future in the context of 
increasing EU regulations fostering competition needs further study. 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden share a common energy history that 
includes gas, first introduced in Sweden through its municipalities.  7 The 
first pipes, transporting gas based on pit coal and cast iron, were built 
under the streets and used for street lighting. Gasworks were first built in 
Sweden in October 1818 by Gustaf Magnus, a professor of the Royal Acad-
emy of Science in Stockholm, who three decades later installed them in 
institutions, businesses and factories (Hyldoft 1995, 78). 
The gasworks rapidly spread around the Nordic countries throughout 
the middle of the XIX century following a diffusion process. Two driving 
forces leading the process of building new gas networks in the Nordic cities 
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were the private companies and the municipalities, in that chronological 
order. Nordic countries were the paradigmatic case in Europe in which the 
municipalities owned and ran the gasworks. Still in 2005 the municipalities 
owned around 60% of Swedish district heating supplies; apart from Nova 
Naturgas and Dong, all gas companies belong to energy companies having 
other activities in the electricity and/or district heating in Sweden (Swedish 
Energy Agency 2005, 39). This double ownership could be part of what was 
described in p.5 as self or endogenous capture. 
After an initial boom of gasworks, followed by the creation of national 
expertise, the lack of better technology and funding impeded the develop-
ment of more extended regional and national networks; it is possible that 
these are still acting mechanisms.8  
The period 1855-1870 went through a parallel boom in the construction 
of municipal gasworks in Copenhagen, Malmo, Schleswig, Stockholm, 
Gothenburg, Oslo and Helsingfors (Hyldoft 1995, 96). This process could be 
understood through the hypothesis tested by Jordana & Levi-Faur (2005), 
in which within sector transnational diffusion had more significant results 
than diffusion across sectors of the same country. Some exogenous obsta-
cles for a Nordic natural gas network in the XX century were the First and 
Second World Wars, as well as the Cold War.9 For example, Russia supplied 
Finland with gas since the 1950’s and with natural gas since 1974, and this 
connection thwarted the integration of the latter in the Nordic energy 
market.10 
Since the beginning of the XIX century, innovations in energy such as 
the use of gaslight were being studied separately in Denmark and Sweden. 
If from this time the Nordic countries would have constructed systematic 
cooperation mechanisms to create knowledge based on common energy 
needs they would have found a broader range of common solutions. On the 
other hand, private companies have repeatedly presented plans for a more 
extended natural gas network development in Sweden, and have frequently 
encountered political resistance at different levels. 
The Nordic natural gas connection is still present in Sweden and there 
are important plans to expand and redefine it in the near future. Supply 
from the gas fields in offshore Jutland will decline in the next years, and a 
way to substitute the Danish natural gas supply with another Nordic 
supplier would be following the plans from energy companies to import 
LNG from Norway and get connected to its field reserves through a pipe-
line.  Plans for building a natural gas pipeline connecting Sweden and 
Norway existed before 1990, but until now they have met the necessary 
conditions to start its construction. 
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One of the main projects in natural gas infrastructure is the construction 
of the Skanled gas pipeline, a gas transmission pipeline that would connect 
the Kårstö processing plan, located at the Norwegian West coast, with 
Sweden and Denmark. In the case that the project is approved by the 
Norwegian, Swedish and Danish authorities the construction would start in 
2010, in parallel to the Nord Stream Pipeline. The intended route of the 
S k a n l e d  p i p e l i n e  w o u l d  b e  f r o m  K å r s t ö  t o  R a f n e s ,  i n  E a s t  N o r w a y ,  t o  
western Sweden and Denmark (Gassco & DNV 2007, 1). 
 The Skanled pipeline is led by Gassco, the Norwegian state operator that 
transports Norwegian gas to Europe and the UK worth more than USD 10 
billion “through a 6,600-km network of pipelines” (Pipeline and Gas 
Journal 2006, 16-17), whereas Swedegas and Energynet.dk participate as 
partners (Gassco & DNV 2007, 4). Nowadays 11 users and 10 investors have 
signed letters of intent to participate in the pipeline or as shippers. 11 These 
companies initially reached an agreement with Gassco in which 7 of them 
would own 70% of the pipeline, and 9 of them would pay for the right for 
using the transportation system (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and 
Energy 2007).  
Norway is, after Russia, the second largest natural gas supplier to the 
EU, and the Skanled pipeline seems to be the ideal way to substitute the 
Danish supply and to keep alive the Nordic energy connection. A shared 
energy history in the region and closeness between Norway and Sweden at 
different levels may represent higher security of supply and less risk of 
discretionary energy policies than in the case of getting connected to other 
sources. 
In 2007, natural gas supply covered 30 Swedish municipalities and 
accounted for only 2% of the national energy use, while through the EU the 
comparable use was around 20% (Swedish Energy Agency 2007a, 44). One 
of the main reasons for this disparity is that its current natural gas network 
does not reach the whole country. In the following years gas transmission 
pipelines will reach Stockholm and other important areas, which will bring 
a boom in the natural gas consumption; i.e. the natural gas consumption in 
the above mentioned 30 municipalities is very close to the EU average.  
Since the adoption in 1998 of the Gas Market Directive by the European 
Commission, Sweden has implemented legislation in the form of Natural 
Gas Acts towards participating in a single energy market. The natural gas 
market has become more competitive with each communitarian directive, 
which have always been followed by governmental Bills to Parliament and 
reflected in new Natural Gas Acts. As a result of the Natural Gas Directive 
(European Union 2003) approved in June 2003, the Parliament imple-
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mented a Natural Gas Act in 2005 that introduced competitive elements in 
the market, such as the separation between trading activities and network 
activities in order to prevent cross-subsidisation (Swedish Energy Agency 
2005, 7). Thanks to 2 different Natural Gas Acts, in July 2005 all non-
domestic consumers were free to choose their suppliers and in July 2007 
the natural gas market was fully deregulated.  
Further directives from the Commission are expected to have a renewed 
repercussion in governmental Bills handled to the Parliament and to be 
translated into new Natural Gas Acts. In synthesis, the EU has been acting 
as an exogenous influence towards more competition in the Swedish natu-
ral gas market, which is still operated as a legal monopoly.  
 
4. The natural gas market: Actors and future  
The Swedish Energy Agency “was created in 1998 and works towards 
transforming the Swedish energy system into an ecological and economi-
cally sustainable system though guiding state capital towards the area of 
energy” (The Swedish Energy Agency 2008). In 2001, The Swedish Energy 
Agency created the Network Oil and Gas (2008), a forum that actively 
exchanges expertise about oil and gas. 
The Energy Market Inspectorate was created in 2005 and is the regula-
tory body within the Swedish Energy Agency in charge of supervising that 
electricity, natural gas and district heating markets operate efficiently, and 
of monitoring the compliance with the Electricity and Natural Gas Acts. 
Another objective is assisting the consumers and a more integrated Nordic 
market in the natural gas sector. Thus, the Market Inspectorate acts on one 
hand towards additional Communitarian integration and on the other 
towards more Nordic and Baltic integration. These aims are defining 
Sweden’s natural gas and energy future, and only then it will be clear how 
compatible these objectives are in practice. 
The natural gas market has been gradually opened to competition after 
different EU Natural Gas Directives came into force; i.e. unbundling12 was 
adopted in the Natural Gas Act that was legally binding in July 2005. The 
way in which unbundling was adopted is another example of how European 
Commission directives have led some of the natural gas reforms proposed 
by the government to Parliament. 
As a result of the continuous reforms introduced in the natural gas 
sector, in the context of an energy transition, higher natural gas use is 
expected in the following years and decades. Some areas with the greatest 
potential are: transportation, industry, residential use, electricity produc-
tion,13 power-heating plants and district heating.  In the latter, natural gas 
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and biogas could replace centrals operated with coal and biofuels, an issue 
that could generate tensions between the local producers of biofuels and the 
natural gas companies. 
The first 8 years after the introduction of natural gas in 1985 resulted in 
an average growth of 1 TWh per year, and since 1993 to date the average 
growth of natural gas use has been around 0.1 TWh per year. When the 
time comes for natural gas to reach Stockholm, it will probably equal or 
increase its initial growth average. Higher natural gas demand will need 
supply from sources other than the Danish sector of the North Sea and new 
pipelines to be built. 
The natural gas system is composed within Sweden of 3,000 kilometers 
of distributional pipelines and 540 kilometers of transmission pipelines, 
and its capacity exceeds its current use. The capacity of the system could be 
increased using compressors, and greater natural gas use is expected due to 
the demand from cogeneration plants in Gothenburg and Malmo (with 
planned start up in 2009), that in a full load could use approximately 8.5 
TWh per year (Swedish Energy Agency 2005, 36). Swede Gas AB owns 
much of the trunk grid of the network, which extends from Trelleborg to 
Gothenburg; in 2004, Swede Gas sold its trading activities to Dong Natural 
Gas. The responsibility for the main b r an c h in s o u t he r n  Sw e de n  is  w it h 
EON Gas Sweden AB, and the overall responsibility for the national gas 
market is with the state utility Svenska Kraftnät, which excludes the opera-
tion of the system and focuses only on “short-term maintenance of the 
balance between supply of natural gas to the national system and delivery of 
gas from it (Swedish Energy Agency 2007a, 44)”. 
In 2007, the Energy Market Inspectorate had received 3 applications for 
extension of the natural gas network; the first 2 are extensions from 
Gislaved/Gnosjö to Oxelösund via Jönköping and Boxholm. The concession 
for the extension via Jönköping is being prepared by the Cabinet Officers 
after it was approved by the Inspectorate. The other concession extension is 
for a transmission pipeline called The Baltic Gas Interconnector, which 
received permission from the government in 2004. The Baltic Gas Inter-
connector includes offshore and onshore sectors and will connect the natu-
ral gas networks of Sweden, Denmark and Germany. The participants are 
Verbundnetz Gas, Sjællandske Kraftværker and Norsk Hydro, E.ON Gas 
Sweden AB (Swedish Energy Agency 2007a). 
In December 2007 the Swedish government received an application 
from Nord Stream “for a permit to lay two pipelines on the continental shelf 
and an application for a permit to construct and use a service platform in 
the Swedish Exclusive Economic Zone (Daoson & Bystedt 2008, 1)”. The 
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applications were being processed under the Continental Shelf Act and the 
Swedish Exclusive Economic Zone Act, international conventions signed by 
Sweden and environmental codes and acts such as The Espoo Convention, 
the Swedish Exclusive Economic Zone Act, and the Swedish Environmental 
Code. 
In February 2008 these applications were considered incomplete by the 
Swedish Ministry of the Environment and the Swedish Ministry of Enter-
prise, Energy and Communications; the main reasons were a lack of a 
general environmental assessment that takes into consideration the Espoo 
Convention,14 and other environmental and international codes for the 
service platforms. The government also wanted to know the final result of 
ongoing or non-conclusive investigations (i.e. an investigation about the 
existence of World War II munitions in the route of the pipeline) before 
going forward with the project and needed alternative locations for the 
service platform and alternative routes for pipelines, in order to consider 
different environmental scenarios. 
The Nord Stream pipeline is planned to be a 1220 km off-shore pipeline, 
and is a joint venture of OAO Gazprom, Wintershall AG/ BASF SE, E.ON 
Ruhrgas AG / E.ON AG and N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie.  This 7.4 billion 
“TEN-E project of European interest”15 will initially connect Russia and 
Germany through a pipeline built under the Baltic Sea. Planned offshoots 
will link the pipeline with Sweden after 2010. This off-shore natural gas 
pipeline project in conjunction with the Skanled pipeline project (discussed 
in previous chapters) will play a decisive role in the future of natural gas use 
in the participants countries and in the energy transition in Sweden. 
One of the main advantages of the Nord Stream project is that it will 
travel directly through the Baltic Sea, avoiding transit through countries 
such as Ukraine, Belarus and Poland, which has raised tensions in the last 
years. The Nord Stream pipeline also represents higher security of supply 
from the Russian reserves. Less than 2% of the world gas reserves are in the 
EU, whose natural gas imports are expected to raise from 41% in 2005 to 
75% in 2030 (Global Insight 2007). Relying on Russia and Norway is a way 
in which Sweden will be able to supply its future natural gas demand and 
avoid depending on the instable Middle East countries, as different 
communitarian countries do.  
Russia is expected to supply more than 50% of the European gas 
demand after 2020, so much of the stability and governance of the EU will 
depend on their energy policies (James A. Baker III Institute for Public 
Policy 2005). A future higher energy dependence derived from a more 
extended use of natural gas in Sweden is conditioned by a context in which 
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the Russian government has frequently used natural gas supply as a geo-
political tool, and used institutions arbitrarily to regain control of its 
formerly privatized natural resources. In words of Larsson (2005, 3) 
“Russia also sees energy as a tool to avert geopolitical macroeconomic and 
other threats”. 
The Russian energy companies, such as LUKOIL, Rosneft and Gazprom, 
operate accordingly to the state’s interests in the “oil and gas game” and in 
the past have acted as agents to impose pressure and achieve political and 
economic objectives within the Russian zone of influence, which increas-
ingly extends throughout Europe.  
Thus, being connected to the Russian natural gas network is also a way 
in which the EU – Sweden included – could suffer geopolitical pressures 
and discretionary energy policies. One way to assure higher certainty of 
non-discretionary actions from the Russian state companies is having the 
Energy Charter Treaty ratified by the Duma. 
Investment in natural gas infrastructure is by definition a long-term 
investment that needs guarantees from both ends of the pipeline. Sweden is 
an ideal client due to its healthy economy and living standards, account-
ability from political institutions, independent regulators, compliance with 
the Natural Gas Directives and increasing competition in the natural gas 
sector, and Russia has the natural gas that Sweden could need in the future. 
But, how will Russia assure non-political interference in the natural gas 
supply in the short, middle and long terms? 
Natural gas supply is closely linked to the political links and alliances 
between the supplier and consumer countries. This interaction could prove 
beneficial in some cases, i.e. increasing economic and political ties between 
Germany and Russia are favoring natural gas supply security and pipeline 
projects; or it could also be damaging, i.e. Russia’s neighbors are aware that 
more integration with the European Union, independence from Russia or 
participating in NATO ventures could be reflected in their gas bill. 
The close links between Germany and Russia are not free of conflict of 
interests, an issue that jeopardizes natural gas competition and energy 
policy accountability in the EU. A few days before the elections in Germany 
were celebrated the former German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder signed 
the initial agreement to build the Nord Stream pipeline between his country 
and Russia. On December  2005, approximately three months after loosing 
the elections and having resigned to his seat in Parliament, he accepted the 
post as chairman of the consortium, a decision that de facto legitimated 
Gazprom’s political interference in the energy market. 
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Schroeder’s participation in the Nord Stream pipeline first as a chancel-
lor and then as a chairman, in the context of constant communitarian 
directives pushing towards more natural gas openness and competition at 
the national level, was a “collaborative, interactive form of mixing”, and 
involved “an ability to achieve synergies between involved persons and 
organizations” (Wettenhall 2007, 5), which are specific conditions of a 
public-private partnership. This case invites further study considering that 
Nord Stream, a major European player as a big infrastructure investment 
project, could have “captured” the German government and different 
communitarian institutions.  
Russia uses its natural gas and oil reserves, managed by their national 
energy companies,  16 to achieve its national interests. This mechanism is 
frequently applied in different degrees by different countries, depending on 
their energy policies, potential of their natural resources, strength of their 
institutions and state companies, independence of their regulators and 
internal and supranational counter balances among others. Russia is 
increasing its geopolitical influence in Europe due to their greater than ever 
natural gas supply and due to the tight control exercised over its national 
energy companies. Getting connected to the Nord Stream pipeline is a way 
in which Sweden will guarantee its future natural gas supply and will be 
closer to the EU, its competition policies, regulations and suppliers, but also 
to Russia’s “oil and gas game”.  
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper studies the link between the current energy transition, regula-
tory and energy policy and natural gas infrastructure and supply in Sweden. 
Analyzing the energy transition in relation to geopolitics, competition and 
governance, and connecting it to the conditions for future natural gas infra-
structure and supply is the main innovative element of the research. 
The analysis places special emphasis on the acting mechanisms operat-
ing between the national and communitarian regulatory frameworks with 
different energy sources and its implication for future governance due to 
security in energy supply.  
Sweden used in 2007 more electricity than oil: the total final use per 
energy carrier for electricity was 132 TWh and for oil was 131 TWh (Swedish 
Energy Agency 2008a, 10), and nuclear energy accounted for 44.3% of this 
electricity. This data reflects the importance of phasing out nuclear termi-
nals and helps to contextualize why this decision has been repetitively 
postponed and encounters resistance from industry and government. 
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Natural gas is environmentally friendly and has great potential towards 
replacing nuclear energy when the terminals are phased out; however, 
private investment in natural gas infrastructure followed by an exponential 
consumption could partly reverse a history of non-fossil fuel reliance and a 
traditional energy ownership model in which government and companies 
work closely together. As long as natural gas is not produced in the country, 
more natural gas supply/consumption would also represent higher depend-
ence on foreign suppliers. Moreover, high taxation is still a barrier for the 
development of a truly competitive natural gas market. 
Under the actual conditions characterized by volatility in oil/natural gas 
prices, continue utilization of nuclear energy seems to be the most cautious 
decision if accompanied by a constant renovation of the terminals that 
permits applying the new technology to make them as safe as possible.  
Conversely, if terminals are slowly phased out and replaced gradually 
with natural gas, there would have to be special attention in designating the 
supplier; the energy surplus that nuclear energy provides represents 
valuable extra time to choose this supplier. In the context of a common 
energy history and strong Nordic links, Norway seems more reliable than 
Russia to be the next main natural gas supplier after a decline in the Danish 
reserves. In addition, non-discretionary binding guarantees have to be 
defined before permission is granted to the Nord Stream to operate in 




1 Gilardi (2003, 13) discovered that competition, electricity, environment, 
financial markets, food, pharmaceuticals and telecoms regulated in Sweden 
through independent agencies present important variation in their level of 
autonomy.  
2 A c c o r d i n g  t o  J o r d a n a  &  L e v i  F a u r  ( 2 0 0 5 )  d i f f u s i o n  m e c h a n i s m s  a r e  
related to a specific region, but act stronger between neighbor countries, or 
countries with a common history. 
3 As a result, Sweden had in 2005 the third lowest emissions rates of tones 
of CO2 per inhabitant in the OECD (OECD 2007). 
4 The Competitiveness Rankings (World Economic Forum 2003, 172) 
reported that tax rates and tax regulations, respectively, were the first 2 
Most Problematic Factors for Doing Business in Sweden. On the other 
hand, Sweden ranked 9/102 in the category judicial independence, which 
represents an ideal condition for attracting private investment in natural 
gas infrastructure. Independence of the judiciary is essential for guaran-
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teeing fairness in the appellate processes and ensuring credibility towards 
the international financial capital, which is the main source of natural gas 
investment in infrastructure.  
5 “For the same amount of energy released, carbon dioxide emissions from 
the combustion of natural gas are 40% less than from combustion of coal 
and 20% less than from oil combustion” (The Swedish Energy Agency 
2005, 37). 
6 This model explains the impact of institutional conditions, regulatory 
governance and regulatory policies, amongst other factors, on private 
investment in infrastructure, and identifies the institutional actors involved 
in a complex process, the acting mechanisms and the causal direction. 
7 The debate between private or municipal participation in natural gas 
projects is still alive. Though, private companies are basic actors working 
towards more openness in the natural gas Swedish sector and the expan-
sion of its network. 
8 “Mechanisms are frequently occurring and easily recognizable causal 
patterns that are triggered under generally unknown conditions or with 
indeterminate consequences. They allow us to explain but not to predict” 
(Elster 1998, 45). 
9 Agfors (1995, 223) identifies competition of oil and electricity in the 
decades after the Second World War as factors for closing the urban gas 
systems within Sweden. 
10 Russia still provides most of the natural gas used in Finland for domestic 
consumption, and it is expected to supply more than 50% of the European 
natural gas demand after 2020, so the stability of the continent will 
increasingly depend on its energy policies (James A. Baker III Institute for 
Public Policy 2005). 
11 The users that signed the letters of intention are Kerling (Hydro Poly-
mers), Borealis, Yara, Statoil, E.ON Ruhrgas, Göteborg Energy, Preem 
Petroleum, Perstorp Oxo, SIGC (Swedish Industrial Gas Consortium), and 
the signing investors are Skagerack Energy, Östfold Energi, Hafslund, 
Agder Energy, E.ON Ruhrgas, Göteborg Energy, Swedegas, Preem Petro-
leum, Energinet.dk and PGNiG (Gassco  & DNV 2007, 1). 
12 In Sweden, the separation of sales and transport of the natural gas 
required in 2004 that “the reports and accounts of the two activities must 
be separated” (Swedish Energy Agency 2004, 37). 
13 Due to the Act Concerning Taxation of Energy, natural gas used for elec-
tricity is free of tax (Swedish Energy Agency 2005, 35). 
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14 “The Espoo (EIA) Convention sets out the obligations of Parties to assess 
the environmental impact of certain activities at an early stage of planning” 
(Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment 2008). 
15 According to the EU Trans-European Energy Networks legislation (Euro-
pean Union 2006, 2) “Appropriate priority for funding under Regulation 
(EC) No 2236/95 should be given to projects declared to be of European 
interest”. 
16 “LUKOIL is number one in the world in terms of oil reserves, and number 
three in terms of total reserves […] Rosneft is number one in the world 
amongst private companies in terms of reserves to production ratio (28 




Agfors, G. 1995. ‘The Missing Link, Attempts at Establishing a Nordic Gas 
Grid’, in Hedin, M. & Kaijser, A. eds., Nordic Energy Systems: Histori-
cal Perspectives and Current Issues. Massachusetts: Science History 
Publications.  
Berg, S. 2001. ‘Infrastructure Regulation: Risk, Return and Performance’, 
Global Utilities, 1, p. 3-10. 
Bernstein, M. 1955. Regulating Business by Independent Commission. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Bloomberg. 2008. Energy Prices. [Online]. Bloomberg. Available at:   
http://www.bloomberg.com/energy/ [accessed 5 January 2009]. 
Coglianese, C., Zeckhauser, R. & Parson, E. 2004. ‘Seeking Truth for Power: 
Informational Strategy and Regulatory Policy Making’, Harvard Public 
Law Working Paper, 101, p. 1-96. 
 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment. 2008. Convention on 
Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context 
(Espoo, 1991) - the 'Espoo (EIA) Convention'. [Online]. United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe. Available at:  http://www.unece.org/ 
env/eia/eia.htm [accessed 5 January 2009]. 
Daoson, M. & Bystedt, E. 2008. Request for a supplement to the applica-
tion for a permit for a pipeline system under the Continental Shelf Act 
(1966:314) and the application for a permit to build and use a service 
platform under the Swedish Exclusive Economic Zone Act (1992:1140). 
[Online]. Swedish Ministry of the Environment & Swedish Ministry of 
Enterprise, Energy and Communications. Available at: 
http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/09/80/19/bf4d8ad6.pdf 
[accessed 5 January 2009]. 
—        — 
 
21 Institutet för Framtidsstuder/Institute for Futures Studies 
Arbetsrapport/Working Paper 2009:9 
 
Elster, J. 1998. A plea for mechanisms, in Hedström, P. & Swedberg, R., ed., 
Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 45-73. 
European Union. 2003. ‘Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament 
and of  the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the 
internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 98/30/EC’, Offi-
cial Journal of the European Union, L 176, p. 57-78. 
European Union. 2006. ‘Decision No 1364/2006/EC of the European 
Parliament and of  the Council of 6 September 2006 laying down guide-
lines for trans-European energy networks and repealing Decision 
96/391/EC and Decision No 1229/2003/EC’, Official Journal of the 
European Union, L 262, p. 1-23. 
Gassco & DNV. 2007. Information concerning the planning of the Skanled 
gas pipeline. [Online]. Energynet.dk. Available at: http://www. 
energinet.dk/NR/rdonlyres/E7D26121-FE5C-46C9-9DCB-7BE95E65CD 
38/0/TheSkanledgaspipelineprojectsummaryver_02_250607.pdf 
[accessed 5 January 2009]. 
James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University. 2005. 
Executive  Summary. The Geopolitics of Natural, 29, p. 1-12. [Online]. 
Available at: http://www.rice.edu/energy/publications/PolicyReports 
/study_29.pdf [accessed 5 January 2009]. 
Gilardi, F. 2003. ‘Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies in 
Western Europe: A Cross-Sectional Comparison’, Paper, ECPR Work-
shop on Delegation in Contemporary Democracies. 
Global Insight. 2007. European Gas Supply and Demand Service, Review 
and Outlook to 2030. [Online]. Global Insight Inc. Available at: 
http://www.globalinsight.com/gcpath/EuroGasSupply.pdf [accessed 5 
January 2009]. 
Henrekson, M. & Jakobsson, U. 2003. ‘The Swedish Model of Corporate 
Ownership and Control in Transition’, The Research Institute of Indus-
trial Economics, 593 , p.1-63. 
Hyldoft, O. 1995. ‘Making Gas, The Establishment of the Nordic Gas 
Systems, 1800-1870’, in Hedin, M. & Kaijser, A. eds. (1995), Nordic 
Energy Systems: Historical Perspectives and Current Issues. 
Massachusetts: Science History Publications.  
Jordana, J. & Levi Faur, D. 2005. ‘Towards a Latin America Regulatory 
State? The Diffusion of Autonomous Regulatory Agencies across Coun-
tries and Sectors’, International Journal of Public Administration, 29 
(4-6), p. 335-366. 
—        — 
 
22 Institutet för Framtidsstuder/Institute for Futures Studies 
Arbetsrapport/Working Paper 2009:9 
 
Laffont, J. & Tirole J. 1994. A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and 
Regulation. Cambridge and London: The MIT Press. 
Larsson, R. 2005. The European Dependence on Russian Energy. [Online]. 
Network Oil and Gas (NOG). Available at: http://www.nog.se/files/ 
NOG%20Ref_%20050913.pdf [accessed 5 January 2009]. 
Murray, J. 2005. The Global Energy Perspective: reflections of the World 
Energy Council. [Online]. Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering 
Sciences. Available at:  http://www.iva.se/upload/Verksamhet/Projekt 
/Energiframsyn/Jan_StockholmMar05.doc [accessed 5 January 2009]. 
Network Oil and Gas. 2008. About NOG. [Online]. Network Oil and Gas. 
Available at: http://www.nog.se/page.asp?node=21 [accessed 5 January 
2009]. 
Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy. 2007. Pipeline project from 
Kårstø to Eastern Norway, Sweden and Denmark. [Online]. Norwegian 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy. Available at: http://www 
.regjeringen.no/en/dep/oed/Press-Center/Press-releases/2007/Pipeline 
-project-from-Karsto-to-Eastern-.html?id=446800 [accessed 5 January 
2009]. 
Nuclear Energy Association. 2008. Nuclear Energy in Sweden. [Online]. 
Nuclear Energy Association. Available at: http://www.world-
nuclear.org/info/inf42.html [accessed 5 January 2009]. 
OECD. 2007. OECD in Figures 2007. Paris: OECD. 
Pierson, P. 2000. ‘Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of 
Politics’, American Political Science Review, 94, p. 251-268. 
Pipeline and Gas Journal. 2006. Projects. Gassco Plans Gas Pipeline To 
Norway and Sweden. [Online] Pipeline and Gas Journal. Available at: 
http://www.pipelineandgasjournal.com/PGJ/pgjarchive/Jan%2006/pr
ojects.pdf [accessed 5 January 2009]. 
Poussenkova, N. 2004. ‘The Energy Dimension in Russian Global Strategy.  
From Rigs to Riches Oilmen vs. Financiers in the Russian Oil Sector’, 
James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University, 6, p. 1-
53. 
Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering Sciences (IVA). 2003. Energy 
Foresight – Sweden in Europe, Report of the Project Steering Group. 
Stockholm: Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering Sciences (IVA). 
Stigler, G. 1971. ‘The Theory of Economic Regulation’, Bell Journal of 
Economics and Management Science, 2, p. 3-21. 
Swedish Energy Agency. 2004. Energy in Sweden 2004. Eskilstuna, Multi-
tryck i Eskilstuna AB: Swedish Energy Agency. 
—        — 
 
23 Institutet för Framtidsstuder/Institute for Futures Studies 
Arbetsrapport/Working Paper 2009:9 
 
—        — 
 
24 
Swedish Energy Agency. 2005. The Swedish Energy Market. Theme: The 
Storm Gudrun. Eskilstuna, Multitryck i Eskilstuna AB: Swedish Energy 
Agency. 
Swedish Energy Agency. 2006. Energy in Sweden 2006. Facts and Figures. 
Eskilstuna, Multitryck i Eskilstuna AB: Swedish Energy Agency. 
Swedish Energy Agency. 2007a. Energy in Sweden 2007. Eskilstuna, 
Multitryck i Eskilstuna AB: Swedish Energy Agency. 
Swedish Energy Agency. 2007b. Energy in Sweden 2007.  Facts and 
Figures. Eskilstuna, Multitryck i Eskilstuna AB: Swedish Energy Agency. 
Swedish Energy Agency. 2008a. Energy in Sweden 2008.  Facts and 
Figures. Eskilstuna, Multitryck i Eskilstuna AB: Swedish Energy Agency. 
Swedish Energy Agency. 2008b. The electricity certificate system, 2008. 
Eskilstuna, Multitryck i Eskilstuna AB: Swedish Energy Agency. 
Swedish Energy Agency. 2008c. About Us. [Online]. Swedish Energy 
Agency. Available at:  http://www.swedishenergyagency.se/WEB/STEM 
Ex01Eng.nsf/F_PreGen01?ReadForm&MenuSelect=7164E78CC77169B
8C1256DE500361A83 [accessed 5 January 2009]. 
Wettenhall, R. 2007. ‘ActewAGL: a genuine public-private partner-
ship?’ International Journal of Public Sector Management, Vol.20 (5), 
p. 392-414. 
World Economic Forum. 2003. Competitiveness Rankings. [Online]. World 
Economic Forum. Available at: http://www.weforum.org/pdf/Gcr/GCR 
_2003_2004/sweden.pdf [accessed 5 January 2009]. 
 
 
















 Former Working Papers:
· Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2000:1- 2006:13, se www.framtidsstudier.se.
· Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2007:1
Nahum, Ruth-Aïda, Child Health and Family Income. Physical and Psychosocial Health.
· Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2007:2
Nahum, Ruth-Aïda, Labour Supply Response to Spousal Sickness Absence.
· Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2007:3
Brännström, Lars, Making their mark. Disentangling the Effects of Neighbourhood and School 
Environments on Educational Achievement.
· Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2007:4
Lindh, Thomas & Urban Lundberg, Predicaments in the futures of aging democracies.
· Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2007:5
Ryan, Paul, Has the youth labour market deteriorated in recent decades? Evidence from 
developed countries.
· Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2007:6
Baroni, Elisa, Pension Systems and Pension Reform in an Aging Society. An Introduction to 
Innthe Debate.
· Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2007:7
Amcoff, Jan, Regionförstoring – idé, mätproblem och framtidsutsikter
· Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2007:8
Johansson, Mats & Katarina Katz, Wage differences between women and men in Sweden – 
the impact of skill mismatch
· Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2007:9
Alm, Susanne, Det effektiva samhället eller det goda livet? Svenska framtidsstudier om 
arbetsliv och fritid från 1970- till 1990-tal.
· Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2007:10
Sevilla, Jaypee, Age structure and productivity growth
· Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2007:11
Sevilla, Jaypee, Fertility and relative cohort size
· Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2007:12
Steedman, Hilary, Adapting to Globalised Product and Labour Markets
· Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2007:13
Bäckman, Olof & Anders Nilsson, Childhood Poverty and Labour Market Exclusion
· Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2007:14
Dahlgren, Göran & Margaret Whitehead, Policies and strategies to promote social equity in 
health
· Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2008:1
Westholm, Erik & Cecilia Waldenström, Kunskap om landsbygden. Dags för en ny agenda!
· Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2008:2
Gartell, Marie, Jans, Ann-Christin & Helena Persson, The importance of education for the 
reallocation of labor. Evidence from Swedish linked employer-employee data 1986-2002
· Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2008:3
Strömblad, Per & Gunnar Myrberg, Urban Inequality and Political Recruitment Networks.
Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2008:4
Forsell, Charlotte, Hallberg, Daniel, Lindh, Thomas & Gustav Öberg, Intergenerational public 
and private sector redistribution in Sweden 2003
· Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2008:5
Andersson, Jenny, The Future Landscape
· Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2008:6
Alm, Susanne, Social nedåtrörlighet mellan generationer
· Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2008:7
Stenlås, Niklas, Technology, National Identity and the State: Rise and Decline of a Small 
State’s Military-Industrial Complex· Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2008:8
Larsson, Jakob, Den öppna samordningsmetoden. EU:s samordningsmetod av 
medlemsländernas välfärdssystem
· Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2008:9
Bergmark, Åke & Olof Bäckman, Socialbidragstagandets mönster – en studie av varaktighet 
och utträden under 2000-talet
· Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2008:9
Bergmark, Åke & Olof Bäckman, Socialbidragstagandets mönster – en studie av varaktighet 
och utträden under 2000-talet
· Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2008:10
Kap, Hrvoje, Education and citizenship in the knowledge society – towards the comparative 
study of national systems of education
· Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2008:11
Zamac, Jovan, Hallberg, Daniel & Thomas Lindh, Low fertility and long run growth in an 
economy with a large public sector
· Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2008:12
Bäckman, Olof & Anders Nilsson, Det andra utanförskapet? Om social exkludering på 
landsbygden
· Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2008:13
Korpi, Martin, Migration and Wage Inequality. Economic Effects of Migration to and within 
Sweden, 1993-2003
· Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2008:14
Gartell, Marie, Jans, Ann-Christin & Helena Persson, The importance of age for the 
reallocation of labor. Evidence from Swedish linked employer-employee data 1986-2002
· Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2008:15
Korpi, Martin, Clark, William A.V. & Bo Malmberg, The Urban Hierarchy and Domestic 
Migration. The Interaction of Internal Migration, Disposable Income and the Cost of Living, 
Sweden 1993-2002
· Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2009:1
Enström Öst, Cecilia, The Effect of Parental Wealth on Tenure Choice. A study of family 
background and young adults housing situation
· Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2009:2
Gartell, Marie, Unemployment and subsequent earnings for Swedish college graduates. A 
study of scarring effects
· Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2009:3
Bergman, Ann & Jan Ch Karlsson, Från shopping till sanningsserum. En typologi över 
förutsägelser
· Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2009:4
Amcoff, Jan; Möller, Peter & Westholm, Erik, När lanthandeln stänger. En studie av 
lanthandelns betydelse för flyttning in och ut och för människorna i byn
· Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2009:5
Lundqvist, Torbjörn, The Emergence of Foresight Activities in Swedish Government 
Authorities
· Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2009:6
Thalberg, Sara, Childbearing of students. The case of Sweden
· Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2009:7
Baroni, Elisa; Žamac, Jovan & Öberg, Gustav, IFSIM Handbook
· Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2009:8
Lundqvist, Torbjörn, Socialt kapital och karteller
ISSN: 1652-120X
ISBN: 978-91-85619-48-1 